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Abstract - This paper provides an overview of a feature, event, and process (FEP) screening argument 
developed for the issue of pyrophoricity as it pertains to the post-closure interment of Department of Energy (DOE) 
spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) at the Yucca Mountain Repository. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A FEP database has been compiled that contains 
all the FEPs identified for the Yucca Mountain 
Repository.  The FEPs contained in it are classified 
as either primary or secondary, with each secondary 
FEP being associated with one or more primary 
FEPs.  An analysis is required for each primary FEP 
that addresses all the issues raised by it and its 
associated secondary FEPs.  Primary FEPs can then 
be screened from further consideration on the basis of 
either probability (less than one chance in 10,000 of 
occurring during the first 10,000 years) or 
consequence (no significant impact on repository 
performance).1  If a primary FEP is screened, then so 
are its associated secondary FEPs. 
This paper provides the results of an analysis of 
the primary FEP “Pyrophoricity” (Yucca Mountain 
FEP database # 2.1.02.08.00)2 and its associated 
secondary FEPs.  For our purposes, pyrophoricity 
will be defined as the self-sustaining oxidation of 
SNF.  The issue of a pyrophoric event (PE) occurring 
needs to be addressed because a PE has the potential 
for increasing the release rate of radionuclides, which 
could impact repository performance.  This analysis 
will examine such issues as: the conditions required 
for a PE to occur, which types of SNF are a concern, 
the impact on adjacent waste packages, and the 
impact a PE would have on repository performance. 
There is not sufficient data available at this time 
to definitely exclude PEs based on their low 
probability of occurrence.  Therefore, this analysis 
will assume that PEs are possible and look at the 
impact they would have on repository performance if 
they were to occur. 
II. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions were used in this 
analysis.  Although some of these assumptions 
appear to be contradictory, they were made to create 
a worst-case scenario.  This worst-case scenario will 
then act as a bounding analysis to determine the 
maximum impact pyrophoricity can have on 
repository performance. 
x Because the SNF canisters will be purged of 
oxygen, no PE can occur until after both the 
waste package and SNF canister have breached.   
x There is sufficient oxygen available to support a 
PE.   
x An ignition source is possible.   
x The main impact a PE would have on the 
involved waste form would be a nearly 
instantaneous release of its soluble radionuclide 
inventory to the environment.  The insoluble 
radionuclides will have a much longer migration 
time.  
x The main impact of a PE on the adjacent waste 
packages would be to cause the waste package to 
breach, and the waste form inside to undergo a 
nearly instantaneous release of its soluble 
radionuclide inventory. 
x A PE’s impact on fuel cladding and non-
oxidized waste form will change its dissolution 
rate.
x A PE will not propagate beyond the two adjacent 
waste packages. 
x The N-reactor waste packages will be evenly 
distributed throughout the repository.   
III. POTENTIAL PYROPHORIC IMPACTS 
A PE can impact repository performance in a 
number of ways.  The most obvious effect would be 
an increase in the release rate of radionuclides from 
the affected waste package to the environment.  The 
following are other effects of concern.  
x The impact a PE would have on other nearby 
waste packages. 
x The potential degradation of the cladding and/or 
waste form of the DSNF contained within the 
involved waste package but not directly involved 
in the pyrophoric oxidation. 
x The impact that a large, quick release of thermal 
energy would have on the surrounding 
geohydrologic system (e.g., could a PE result in 
an increase or decrease in local percolation 
rates?).  
With the exception of the impact on the 
surrounding geohydrologic system, this analysis will 
address these issues either by direct analysis or by the 
use of bounding arguments.  For example, the issue 
of a PE’s impact on non-oxidized fuel cladding and 
waste form within the involved waste package will be 
bounded by assuming that intact fuel cladding does 
not impact DSNF dissolution rates.  This is a 
conservative assumption, but is in-step with the 
TSPA-VA,3 which took no credit for DSNF cladding. 
 The issue of the impact a PE would have on the 
involved waste package is addressed by the 
assumptions that a PE can only occur after its waste 
package has breached (no further credit is given for 
waste package integrity following its breach).  The 
impact a PE would have on nearby waste packages is 
addressed by conservatively assuming they would 
fail. 
Regarding the issue of the impact on the 
surrounding geohydrologic system, it can be 
postulated that changes in local percolation rates 
could result from changes in the surrounding rock 
strata caused by a PE’s thermal energy.  However, it 
was assumed that a waste package must be breached 
prior to undergoing a PE.  Also, the TSPA-VA 
models the complete dissolution of the waste form 
within a breached waste package to occur within one 
time step following its breach.  Therefore, changes in 
local percolation rates would not significantly impact 
the TSPA model. 
Because the N-reactor fuel (zirconium-clad 
uranium-metal fuel) has the greatest potential for 
being pyrophoric, for simplicity, this analysis was 
limited to N-reactor SNF.  Other reasons for making 
this simplification include the following.  The N-
reactor fuel represents the overwhelming majority of 
the DSNF (2100 MTHM of the total 2721 MTHM).4
The N-reactor DSNF waste packages will contain the 
largest concentrations of DSNF (up to about 20 
MTHM each).  Most of the other DSNF will be 
packaged in relatively low concentrations (averaging 
approximately 0.15 MTHM per waste package) in 
co-disposal waste packages, which contain one 
canister of DSNF along with four or five canisters of 
high level waste (HLW).  And, most of the other 
DSNFs are not pyrophoric in nature.  
IIIA. Screening Argument (Consequence-Based) 
The following argument covers a spectrum of 
PE scenarios and evaluates their consequences on 
repository performance.  It uses conservative 
assumptions regarding the impact on adjacent waste 
packages.  It addresses pyrophoricity in terms of both 
the total radionuclides that could be released due to a 
PE and the effect a PE could have on the peak offsite 
dose.  A sensitivity analysis is included to evaluate 
the effects of clustering. 
IIIB. Potential impact on the total amount of 
radionuclide released 
Over the period of one million years following 
repository closure, some percentage of the 12,000 
total waste packages will fail.  Using the conservative 
assumptions that every N-reactor waste package 
breach will result in a PE and each PE will fail the 
two adjacent waste packages, adjacent waste 
packages equal to twice the number of failed N-
reactor waste packages could potentially fail due to 
PEs. In reality, some portions of these adjacent waste 
packages may have failed prior to its corresponding 
PE and another portion would have failed 
independently sometime later in the million-year 
period.  Therefore, by assuming the various types of 
waste packages (WPs) are evenly distributed 
throughout the repository, the increase in the total 
number of waste-package failures during the million-
year period due to PEs can be calculated as follows: 
(# non-failed WPs/total WPs)(# PE-induced 
failures/event)(PE rate per # WPs failed) (total # WPs 
failed) 
Table 1 looks at a range of potential repository 
performances (measured in terms of the fraction of 
waste packages that fail during the one-million-year 
period).  It provides the potential increase in the 
number of waste-package failures resulting from PEs 
for a range of possible repository performances. 
Because an even distribution of waste-package types 
was assumed, this should correspond to the increase 
in the total amount of radionuclides released over the 
one-million-year period.  It should be noted that the 
TSPA-VA analysis indicated that approximately 
100% of the waste packages will be failed at 
1,000,000 years and the Enhanced Design 
Alternative-II (EDA-II)5 estimated that 
approximately 89% of the waste packages will have 
failed at 1,000,000 years. 
Thus, assuming that over the million-year 
period, some additional waste packages could fail 
due to PEs, Table 1 provides the range of possible 
impacts.  It is interesting to note that the better the 
repository performs (i.e., the lower the percentage of 
failed waste packages at 1,000,000 years), the greater 
the impact PEs could have in term of percent increase 
in radionuclide release.  However, the total repository 
release would also be significantly lower as 
repository performance increases.  It should be noted 
that these values were achieved by conservatively 
assuming that all breached N-reactor waste packages 
resulted in a PE of sufficient intensity to damage the 
two adjacent waste packages. 
Assuming PEs are possible, the proceeding 
analysis provides an estimated range of the maximum 
overall increase in the amount of radionuclides that 
could be released during the million-year period, over 
that which would occur if PEs are not possible.  
However, it does not address the potential impact PEs 
could have on peak-offsite-dose rates.  Nor does it 
address the possible impacts that could arise from the 
clustering of PEs in a short time frame. 
IIIC. Impact of PE on peak offsite dose 
The impact a single PE would have on peak 
offsite dose can be bounded by probabilistically 
assessing the potential worst-case release from a 
failed waste package, in terms of the potential percent 
increase in radionuclide release. The following 
presents an assessment based on the worst-case 
release from a failed waste package, in terms of the 
potential percent increase in radionuclide release, if 
the waste package failure results in a PE.  It is 
independent of any particular repository model. 
The initial peak dose following waste package 
failure is due primarily to the release of the highly 
soluble isotopes I-129 and Tc-99.  The corresponding 
long-term dose is associated with the much slower 
release rate of Np-237.  A pyrophoric event involving 
a single N-reactor waste package with the 
simultaneous failure of the two adjacent commercial 
SNF waste packages could be estimated to result in a 
peak offsite dose that is equivalent to approximately 
three times the value of a single waste package 
Table 1.  Potential increase in radionuclide release.
% Waste Packages 
Failed at 1,000,000 
years 
Total # of 
Waste Packages 
Failed 
# of N-reactor 
Waste Packages 
Failed 
# of Additional Waste 
Packages Failed 
Because of PEs  
% Increase in 
Radionuclide 
Inventory Released 
Due to PEs 
60 7200 60 48 0.7% 
70 8400 70 42 0.5% 
80 9600 80 32 0.3% 
90 10,800 90 18 0.2% 
100 12,000 100 0 0.0% 
failure.  In actuality, even though the N-reactor waste 
packages contain more SNF, they contain 
significantly smaller amounts of Tc-99, I-129, and 
Np-237.  
 In terms of the percent increase in radionuclide 
release, the worst case a PE involving a single N-
reactor waste package can have (assuming the two 
adjacent waste packages also fail) would be if it 
involved the repository’s first waste-package failure.  
In this case the initial release would be approximately 
three waste package equivalents (WPEs) of 
radionuclides rather than one waste package 
equivalent.  However, the probability that an N-
reactor waste package is the first waste package to 
fail is equal to approximately 100 divided by 12,000, 
or about 0.01. 
 Therefore, on average, the worst-case increase in 
radionuclide release attributable to a single PE can be 
calculated as the probability that it does not involve 
an N-reactor waste package times 1 WPE plus the 
probability it does involve an N-reactor waste 
package times three WPEs. 
(0.99)(1 WPE) + (0.01)(3 WPEs) = 
1.02 WPEs. 
This represents a 2% increase in peak offsite 
dose above that which would result if PEs are not 
possible.  To put this into perspective, the TSPA-VA 
estimates a peak offsite dose of approximately 300 
mrem at around the 300,000-year period.  If PEs are 
possible, then the peak offsite dose could increase to 
306 mrem. 
IIID. Clustering sensitivity model 
Clustering can be defined as multiple waste 
packages failing in a short time period.  They can be 
postulated as being either induced by some initiating 
event that is not associated with pyrophoricity or 
DSNF (non-pyrophorically-induced cluster) or 
induced by an initiating PE that results in subsequent 
PEs (pyrophorically-induced cluster).  Clustering 
events can be potentially important in that they could 
result in a higher peak offsite dose.  Although no 
credible mechanisms have been identified that would 
result in a clustering of PEs, we will address the 
impact on peak offsite dose that would result, should 
a clustering event occur. 
Regarding non-pyrophorically-induced clusters, 
an argument can be made similar to that in the 
preceding section.  It does not matter how many 
waste packages are involved in some random event 
that results in clustering, each waste package 
involved has approximately 0.01 probability of being 
an N-reactor waste package, which might then result 
in a PE.  Therefore, the maximum impact PEs could 
have on the peak dose associated with a non-
pyrophorically-induced clustering event would be a 
2% increase in the dose resulting from that clustered 
event.  This conservatively assumes that the waste 
packages adjacent to the PE waste package were not 
failed during the clustering event.  It also assumes 
that none of the involved waste packages (or their 
adjacent waste packages) had failed at some previous 
time and all the involved N-reactor waste package 
failures result in a PE.   
Climatic changes have been postulated as a 
mechanism for inducing simultaneous PEs.  
However, because of the rapid dissolution of the 
waste form following waste package failure (less than 
1000 years), climatic changes have been dismissed as 
a cause for PE-induced clustering.  The PE-induced 
clustering event can be dismissed based on the 
expected separation that will exist between N-reactor 
waste packages.  Also, there is probably insufficient 
oxygen available in a drift to support multiple PEs 
occurring simultaneously.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
From the proceeding consequence-based 
analysis, it can be seen that a pyrophoric event would 
have only a minimal impact on repository 
performance.  In terms of the potential increase in 
total radionuclides released over the repository’s 
lifetime, the impact of PEs would probably not 
exceed a 1% increase in the total amount of 
radionuclides released.  In terms of the peak offsite 
dose that could result from a single PE, it was 
demonstrated that regardless of the model used a PE 
would, at most, have a 2% increase in peak offsite 
dose above the dose that would be obtained if PEs 
were not possible.  To put this into perspective, the 
TSPA-VA estimates a peak offsite dose of 
approximately 300 mrem at around the 300,000-year 
period.  If PEs are possible, then the peak offsite dose 
could increase to 306 mrem.  As for clustered events, 
unrealistic scenarios involving incredible 
mechanisms would be required to generate more than 
a 2% increase in peak offsite dose. 
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